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When US scholars speak of “sovereignty”,  
what do they mean?1  
1. INTRODUCTION 
This article examines American conceptions of sovereignty—as they appear in the writ-
ings of US scholars of international law, and those US international relations scholars 
who deal with international law.  At first glance, the US literature is dominated by two 
distinct conceptions of sovereignty: (1) A statist conception that privileges the territorial 
integrity and political independence of governments regardless of their democratic or 
undemocratic character; (2) A popular conception that privileges the rights of peoples 
rather than governments, especially when widespread human rights violations are com-
mitted by a totalitarian regime. However, on closer examination, the two conceptions 
are in fact different manifestations of a single, uniquely American conception of sover-
eignty—one which elevates the United States above other countries and seeks to protect 
it against outside influences while, concurrently, maximizing its ability to intervene 
overseas.  
The single conception of sovereignty is able to encompass both statist and popular 
sub-conceptions because the latter have different—though not mutually exclusive—
agendas. The statist conception is concerned with protecting the United States against 
outside influences and has little to say about the sovereignty of other countries. The 
popular conception is concerned with limiting the sovereignty of other countries and has 
little to say about the sovereignty of the United States. This article exposes the single 
US conception of sovereignty—as it exists in the academic literature of international 
law and international relations—and arrives at some tentative conclusions derived from 
the unique position and history of the world’s most powerful state. 
2. TWO CONCEPTIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY 
Stephen Krasner and Louis Henkin provide us with exemplars of the two different US 
conceptions of sovereignty, with Krasner’s work being representative of the statist ap-
proach. He argues that it is: “[o]nly by creating a mythical past [that] contemporary ob-
servers have been able to make facile comments about the impact of globalisation on 
sovereignty”.2 In actual fact, sovereignty has always been challenged. In recent years 
                                                 
1  This article (forthcoming: Vol. 54, Political Studies) is part of a larger project on “Sovereignty, the State and 
Fundamental Transformations in Public International Law” funded by the TranState Project at the University of 
Bremen, Germany. We are grateful for constructive criticism from James Baker, Kal Holsti, Wade Huntley, Brian 
Job, Richard Price, Stephan Leibfried and Mark Zacher. 
2  Krasner, Stephen D., ‘Globalisation and Sovereignty’ in Smith, David A. Solinger; Dorothy J.; and Topik, 
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that challenge has come from two different directions: globalisation and the rise of hu-
man rights. Yet neither of these challenges alters the basic nature of rules, compliance 
and behaviour in the international system: to Krasner, this will always be characterised 
by “organised hypocrisy”.3 Self-interest is still the defining cause of action, and sover-
eignty—despite seeming under threat—is not about to disappear, given the powerful 
state interest in its continued existence. 
Henkin’s work is representative of the popular conception of sovereignty. Henkin ar-
gues that sovereignty is the primary obstacle to international law as it should be. It is a 
misleading and misguided term, an anachronistic hangover from the days of princedoms 
that is “largely unnecessary and better avoided”.4 Whereas Krasner implicitly attributes 
normative value to state survival, Henkin argues: “The state system is a human creation 
and a human development; it ought to be continually examined, occasionally calibrated, 
and sometimes changed, the better to serve human purposes”.5 Indeed, Henkin believes 
that the international system has already moved toward human values as its organising 
principle,6 that “human rights law has shaken the sources of international law, reshaped 
its character and enlarged its domain”7, and thus radically derogated from and infringed 
upon sovereignty.  
These two conceptions of sovereignty—statist and popular—permeate most of the 
US literature on international relations and international law. And, as is demonstrated 
by some prominent theoretical writings, what appear to be different conceptions of sov-
ereignty more often than not collapse into a single conception—a conception which 
generally favours the United States. 
3. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
One of the more fertile areas of international theory in the United States concerns the 
relationship between international law and international relations. Consequently, the 
interdisciplinary literature of “IL/IR” offers valuable insights into US conceptions of 
sovereignty. 
John Mearsheimer offers an unashamedly realist approach to international institu-
tions (including international law) that comports clearly to the statist conception of sov-
ereignty. He argues that the key disagreement between realists and so-called “institu-
                                                                                                                                               
Stephen C., (eds.) States and Sovereignty in the Global Economy (London: Routledge, 1999), pp. 34-52, p. 49. 
3  Krasner, Stephen D., Sovereignty: Organised Hypocrisy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999). 
4  Henkin, Louis, International Law: Politics and Values (Boston: M. Nijhoff, 1995), p. 9. 
5  Henkin, International Law, p. 25. 
6  Henkin, Louis, ‘Human Rights and State “Sovereignty”’ Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law 
(1995-6) vol. 25, pp. 31-45, p. 32. 
7  Henkin, ‘Human Rights and State “Sovereignty”’, p. 36. 
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tionalists” concerns whether institutions markedly affect the prospects for international 
stability.8 To realists, institutions reflect the distribution of power in the world; based on 
the self-interested calculations of the great powers, they have no independent effect on 
state behaviour.9 States will participate in an institution only while it remains in their 
interest to do so. Mearsheimer rejects the institutionalists’ claim that institutions can 
produce cooperation, stability and, potentially, peace. Institutionalism has focused on 
absolute gains, and on areas where state interests align and cooperation is easy to se-
cure. This has produced excessive optimism over the capacities and potential of institu-
tions.10 Indeed: “What is most impressive about institutions, in fact, is how little inde-
pendent effect they seem to have had on state behaviour”.11 To Mearsheimer the over-
riding logic of the system is self-help: states will do as much as they are able to get 
away with. International law has made few if any inroads on sovereignty.  
Liberals have a different picture of the international system and the role of interna-
tional law and other institutions. Robert Keohane argues that, in order to be able to un-
derstand international cooperation and discord, “it is necessary to develop a knowledge 
of how international institutions work, and how they change”.12 Without institutions 
there can be little international cooperation and, without international cooperation, “the 
prospects for our species would be very poor indeed”.13  
Keohane divides approaches to international institutions into instrumentalist and 
normative “optics”. Seen through the instrumentalist optic, “states use the rules of inter-
national law as instruments to attain their interests”.14 Seen through the normative optic, 
“shared norms, and the processes by which those norms are interpreted”, have an impact 
on state policies.15 The normative optic does not ignore power or interests but argues 
that such explanations are insufficient. According to Keohane, international relations 
scholars tend to be instrumentalists and international law scholars tend to be normative, 
and a synthesis of the optics can help explain international institutions. 
                                                 
8 Mearsheimer, John J., ‘The False Promise of International Institutions’ International Security (1994-5), vol. 19, 
no. 3, pp. 5-49, p. 7. 
9  Mearsheimer, ‘The False Promise of International Institutions’, p. 7. 
10  Mearsheimer, ‘The False Promise of International Institutions’, p. 47. 
11  Mearsheimer, ‘The False Promise of International Institutions’, p. 47. 
12  Keohane, Robert O., 'International Institutions: Two Approaches', International Studies Quarterly, 32:4, (1988) 
pp. 379-96, p. 379. 
13  Keohane, ‘Two Approaches’, p. 393. 
14  Keohane, Robert O., ‘International Relations and International Law: Two Optics’ Harvard International Law 
Journal (1997) vol. 38, pp. 487-502, p. 488. 
15  Keohane, ‘Two Optics’, p. 488. 
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At the same time, Keohane argues that both optics can be characterised as instrumen-
talist: the instrumentalist optic is straightforwardly so, while the normative optic’s con-
cern for reputation is a “classically instrumentalist concept”.16 Both optics use narrative 
accounts to trace causal pathways. Both focus on elite groups of decision-makers and, 
crucially, (and certain normative optics people would say Keohane misinterprets them 
here) “these elites are viewed as making calculations about the consequences of their 
actions”.17 In other words, they are rational. 
Although international institutions can affect states’ formulation of interest, the ra-
tional calculation of interest remains the supreme analytical concern. Thus Keohane 
writes: “In the normative optic, [states’]… purpose is to realise their principles; in the 
instrumentalist one, to achieve self-interested objectives”18, though he presages this with 
“states cultivate reputations because of what good reputations will enable them to a-
chieve.”19  
Keohane’s emphasis here on rational choice and a statist ontology suggests a broadly 
statist conception of sovereignty. And this comes as no surprise, since Keohane has de-
voted much of his career to advancing of a theory of international institutions that aligns 
those institutions with the interests of powerful states. As we argue later with regard to 
his work on intervention, Keohane manifests an underlying, distinctly American con-
ception of sovereignty: using a statist conception to buttress US sovereignty while ap-
plying a popular conception to limit the sovereignty of other, less powerful states. In 
this respect, his conception of sovereignty is different—but not all that different—from 
Mearsheimer’s realist approach. 
Anne-Marie Slaughter similarly advances a liberal interpretation of what the two dis-
ciplines should learn from each other and the type of world they see. Both disciplines 
study the regularities of state behaviour, and many scholars are “newly insisting on the 
importance of law as an explanatory factor” in the analysis of that behaviour.20  
To Slaughter, liberal theory is based on three assumptions.21 First, the fundamental 
actors are “members of domestic society, understood as individuals and privately 
                                                 
16  Keohane, ‘Two Optics’, p. 494. 
17  Keohane, ‘Two Optics’, p. 495. Postpositivists would argue that actors are not capable of being entirely rational 
about their interests and circumstances. 
18  Keohane, ‘Two Optics’, p. 500. 
19  Keohane, ‘Two Optics’, p. 500. 
20  Slaughter, Anne-Marie; Tulumello, Andrew S.; and Wood, Stepan, ‘International Law and International Relations 
Theory: A New Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship’, American Journal of International Law  (1998) vol. 
92, pp. 367-397, p. 369. 
21  It is clear that this type of liberalism has relatively little in common with classic liberal theorists, such as Locke or 
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constituted groups seeking to promote their independent interests.”22 Second, “[a]ll go-
vernments represent some segment of domestic society, whose interests are reflected in 
state policy.”23 Finally, “[t]he behaviour of states—and hence levels of international 
conflict and cooperation—reflects the nature and configuration of state preferences.”24 
According to Slaughter, a liberal conceptualisation of the role of law in international 
politics would move beyond institutionalism by providing tools to determine when mu-
tual interests exist that can be furthered by international cooperation, and when institu-
tions will be epiphenomenal.25 As a result, “[a] liberal approach… opens the door to a 
new normative agenda in international law that in turn could change the conceptual ap-
paratus employed by IR theorists”,26 namely, by enabling them to see and theorise the 
emergence of new norms. However, when Slaughter puts her theory into action, the 
resulting interests—and the mechanisms for implementing those interests—take on a 
distinctly American flavour that works to strengthen US sovereignty while undermining 
the sovereignty of other, less powerful states.  
In Slaughter’s latest work, A New World Order, she rejects what she sees as an in-
terminable debate about the changing nature of sovereignty. The flaw is that everyone 
“still assumes that sovereignty is an attribute borne by an entire state, acting as a unit”.27 
The solution is the notion of the disaggregated state, broken down into its component 
parts: regulatory, judicial and legislative. The central conceptual move of the book is to 
argue that: “if states are acting in the international system through their component gov-
ernment institutions – regulatory agencies, ministries, courts, legislatures – why 
shouldn’t each of these institutions exercise a measure of sovereignty as specifically 
defined and tailored to their functions and capabilities?”.28 This may seem strange but, 
Slaughter argues, if we see sovereignty, not as the power to exclude external meddling, 
but as the capacity to participate in international institutions of all types, then it is an 
altogether more manageable concept. 
Clearly, the government networks that Slaughter sees as characterising the current 
world order, and her articulation of sovereignty, remains strongly attached to the statist 
                                                                                                                                               
J.S. Mill. 
22  Andrew Moravcik quoted in Slaughter, Anne-Marie, ‘International Law and International Relations Theory: A 
Dual Agenda’, American Journal of International Law (1993) vol. 87, pp. 205-239, p. 227. 
23  Moravcik quoted in Slaughter, ‘A Dual Agenda’, p. 228. 
24  Slaughter, ‘A Dual Agenda’, p. 228. 
25  Slaughter, ‘A Dual Agenda’, p. 223. 
26  Slaughter, ‘A Dual Agenda’, p. 235. 
27  Slaughter, Anne-Marie, A New World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), p. 267. 
28  Slaughter, A New World Order, p. 267. 
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paradigm. Her central ontological assumption—government networks—consist solely 
of the members of state bureaucracy, interacting with their counterparts in other coun-
tries or in supranational organisations.29 The role of NGOs, transnational corporations, 
or any grouping that is not governmental is minimal and not of serious theoretical con-
cern. Thus Slaughter’s conception of sovereignty, despite her claim to a new articula-
tion, is actually very statist and traditional. And it favours those powerful states—and 
especially the United States—with large, well-resourced bureaucracies. 
Alexander Wendt’s “constructivist” approach challenges the central assumption of 
realism: that the anarchical nature of the international system predisposes states to be-
have in certain ways. Wendt attempts to forge a “via media”30 between realism’s focus 
on structure as the ultimate causal force in the international system, and the focus of 
reflectivist approaches on processes of interaction.31 Whereas neo-realists treat the self-
help nature of anarchy as the logic of the system, Wendt argues that collective meanings 
define the structures which organise our actions, and actors acquire their interests and 
identities by participating in such collective meanings. Self-help is one such institution, 
hence Wendt’s now infamous assertion: “Anarchy is what states make of it”.32 In other 
words, self-help is not an inevitable part of the international system but, at some level, a 
choice that states have made and re-make with every interaction.  
Sovereignty is another institution that “exists only in virtue of certain intersubjective 
understandings and expectations which not only constitute a particular kind of state—
the ‘sovereign’ state—but also constitute a particular form of community, since identi-
ties are relational”.33 The norms of sovereignty are continually reinforced and if, for 
some reason, states stopped respecting and adhering to those norms, the institution of 
sovereignty would disappear. It is not a “once-for-all creation of norms that somehow 
exist apart from practice.”34 
We question Wendt’s argument on several counts. First, the social structures which 
play such a central role are very “light” things, made up of the ideas that actors hold. 
However, social structures surely reflect material structures, at least to some extent? 
Indeed, many would argue that we believe certain things because it is in our interest to 
                                                 
29  Slaughter, A New World Order, pp. 4-5. 
30  Baylis, John and Smith, Steve, (eds.) The Globalisation of World Politics: An Introduction to International Rela-
tions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 183-4. 
31  Wendt, Alexander, ‘Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics’, International 
Organization (1992) vol. 46, no. 2, pp. 391-425. 
32  Wendt, ‘Anarchy is what States Make of it’, p. 395, emphasis removed. 
33  Wendt, ‘Anarchy is what States Make of it’, p. 412. 
34  Wendt, ‘Anarchy is what States Make of it’, p. 413. 
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do so. Second, Wendt’s theory pays little attention to power structures and the role po-
wer plays in the social interactions which, for Wendt, create identities and interests. 
Third, if interaction is prior to identities and interests, is there really a point of “first” 
interaction in which identity and interaction are unformed? 
Wendt’s work on sovereignty treats institutions and ideational structures as malle-
able. From his perspective, our conception of sovereignty can be rewritten simply by 
thinking about it differently. But while some evolution of the institution of sovereignty 
has undoubtedly occurred, the fluidity and “lightness” of Wendt’s theorisation of social 
institutions would seem to take it too far. It ignores the impact of material differences 
between states, of power, and of centuries-old national conceptions of statehood and 
sovereignty—and this, intentionally or not, favours the world’s most powerful state. 
Although Wendt and other scholars of international relations in the United States 
take various approaches to sovereignty, those who have dealt with international coop-
eration and international law have relied on an underlying statist conception of sover-
eignty, or at least US sovereignty, while exhibiting more flexibility with regard to the 
sovereignty of other states. Perhaps it is not surprising that a discipline so consumed by 
a statist ontology and questions of power would fall back on traditional assumptions 
when venturing onto new ground. Yet many other international relations scholars deal 
with explicitly normative concerns and would undoubtedly adopt a more popular con-
ception of sovereignty—if they wrote about international law. But since these scholars 
they have not yet done so, there is thus little evidence of a popular conception of sover-
eignty in this particular field of study. 
4. MILITARY INTERVENTION 
Military intervention is one of the key ways in which sovereignty is infringed and the 
US literature concerning it is particularly interesting for us—because conceptions of 
popular sovereignty are frequently deployed in justification.  
In 1992, Thomas Franck seized upon the idea that governments derive their power 
and legitimacy from the consent of the governed, and used it to justify military interven-
tion. Franck identified two emerging trends: legitimacy is increasingly dependent upon 
democracy and, as a result, there is an emerging right to democratic governance. Franck 
attributed to democratic states the power to recognise other states as legitimate, and ar-
gued that new regimes “want, indeed need, to be validated by being seen to comply with 
global standards for free and open elections”.35 However, Franck failed to explain why 
democratic states chose to do this, and why new regimes felt compelled to prove their 
democratic credentials. Franck’s explanation was simply that, since the end of the Sec-
ond World War, international institutions—primarily the UN, regional organisations 
                                                 
35  Franck, ‘The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance’, p. 48. 
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like the European Union and Organization of American States, and NGOs—all sought 
to promote democracy. They did so primarily through the adoption of conventions such 
as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. These conventions form the 
basis for Franck’s right to democratic governance. He makes no mention of the power 
which accrues to rich countries as a result of the aid and trade they can offer smaller 
countries; nor is there any mention of the politics of democracy promotion.  
What Franck does do is provide a clear link between democracy and sovereignty, or 
more pertinently, non-democracy and the absence of sovereignty. He writes: “undemo-
cratic processes imposed on a people by their government are almost universally re-
garded as counternormative and not beyond the purview of the international commu-
nity.”36 And this in turn, Franck argues, renders possible and justifies pro-democratic 
intervention. Of course, the United States, as an extremely powerful and more-or-less 
democratic country, is immune from such interference; its sovereignty remains intact. 
Anthony D’Amato also linked human rights and intervention, arguing that rules pro-
hibiting intervention “do not constitute the real rules of international law but, rather, are 
quasi-rules, invented by ruling elites to insulate their domestic control against external 
challenge”.37 Consequently, sovereignty is no bar to the protection of human rights.38 
Although D’Amato’s preference is for multilateral intervention, ideally by the United 
Nations, his “bottom line is that… any nation with the will and the resources may inter-
vene to protect the population of another nation against… tyranny”.39 Again, D’Amato’s 
argument is inapplicable to the United States, except in so far as it facilitates US inter-
ventions elsewhere. 
Michael Reisman argued that the term sovereignty “has had a long and varied history 
during which it has been given different meanings, hues and tones, depending on the 
context and the objectives of those using the word”.40 It evolved away from meaning the 
power and control of a prince over his kingdom, to meaning popular sovereignty, vested 
in the people and based on human rights. Reisman contended that a coup, putsch, or 
even just corruption of the electoral process constitutes a violation of popular sover-
eignty and that the traditional idea of sovereignty, which would have prevented inter-
vention by other states, is irrelevant to such situations. Thus, “a jurist rooted in the late 
                                                 
36  Franck, ‘The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance’, p. 83. 
37  D’Amato, Anthony, ‘The Invasion of Panama was a Lawful Response to Tyranny’, American Journal of Interna-
tional Law (1990), vol. 84, pp. 516-524, pp. 522-3. 
38  D’Amato, “The Invasion of Panama’, p. 522. 
39  D’Amato, “The Invasion of Panama’, pp. 519-20, original emphasis.  
40  Reisman, W. Michael, ‘Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law’ American Journal of 
International Law (1990) vol. 84, no. 4, pp. 866-876, p. 866. 
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twentieth century can hardly say that an invasion by outside forces to remove the cau-
dillo and install the elected government is a violation of national sovereignty”.41  
In international law, the right of self-defence can be used to limit sovereignty at the 
same time that it is deployed to protect it. It has long been accepted that any state which 
attacks another state waives its right to the protections of sovereignty, within the limits 
of necessity and proportionality. But what about an attack that has yet to happen, and 
may never happen? John Yoo argues that the customary international law right to use 
force in anticipation of an attack is a “well-established aspect of the ‘inherent right’ of 
self-defence”42, an argument he bases on article 51 of the UN Charter. With the concept 
of imminence having evolved since the development of nuclear weapons, there is a re-
formulated, expanded test for pre-emption. Yoo claims that this reformulated test was 
used to justify the 2003 Iraq War—though, as a justification, it collapsed in the absence 
of weapons of mass destruction.  
Robert Keohane and Allan Buchanan propose a schema for pre-emptive intervention 
which comprises ex ante and ex post accountability. Before intervening, states would 
make an evidence-based claim and agree to submit themselves to evaluation by an im-
partial body afterwards. If the action proved justified, those states that had not shoul-
dered the risk and costs of intervention would bear “special responsibility for financial 
support in rebuilding the country”.43 But if the action was found by the impartial body to 
have been unjustified, the intervening states would have to provide compensation. Mo-
reover, they would not be allowed to control the political situation in the intervened-in-
state.  
There are several problems with Keohane and Buchanan’s schema. Most notably, no 
state would have the option of opting out or simply disagreeing with the intervention 
regardless of the outcome, or even just disagreeing over the evaluation. There are sha-
des of “you’re either with us or against us” here. Likewise, an impartial, independent 
body—the UN Security Council—arguably already exists to validate uses of force, 
though there the veto power of four other countries constrains US power too much for 
Buchanan and Keohane’s purposes. Finally, under the schema, if a group of democratic, 
“morally reliable” states wished to intervene in unjustified circumstances they would 
still be allowed to do so—providing that they paid for the privilege. This surely cannot 
be right. Clearly, Buchanan and Keohane’s schema is underpinned by a statist concep-
                                                 
41  Reisman, ‘Sovereignty and Human Rights’, p. 871. 
42  Yoo, John C., ‘International Law and the War in Iraq’ American Journal of International Law vol. 97, (July 
2003) p. 563-576, p. 571. 
43  Buchanan, Allen, and Keohane, Robert O., ‘The Preventive Use of Force: A Cosmopolitan Institutional Proposal’ 
Ethics and International Affairs (2004) vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 1-22, p. 14. 
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tion of sovereignty—a selective form of statist sovereignty that enables the United 
States to retain its sovereignty while facilitating intervention in other, less powerful 
states.  
Writing on his own, Keohane asserts that a neglected element of the decision to in-
tervene is the question of what happens afterwards: “In the next era of world politics we 
may observe a new phenomenon: the constructive phase of humanitarian intervention 
following traditional military intervention in self-defence”.44 In this context, Keohane 
argues that we need to un-bundle sovereignty so that we can appreciate its gradations. 
And since sovereignty impedes further interventions to protect minority rights, it is 
foolhardy to grant unconditional sovereignty to new states with severe ethnic divisions. 
Instead, sovereignty should be compromised post-intervention to maintain peace and 
stability and to protect human rights, with a NATO or UN “proconsul” remaining in 
charge. Sovereignty would at first be denied, then nominal (legal) sovereignty reintro-
duced, and then domestic governance handed over to locals. Finally, what Keohane 
terms “integrated sovereignty” would result, under continued UN oversight.  
Importantly, Keohane’s unbundling of sovereignty does not apply to all states, and 
certainly not to the most powerful state. As Martti Koskenniemi points out: “We deal 
with military intervention, peace enforcement, or the fight against terrorism in the neu-
tral language of legal rules and humanitarian moralities, and so come to think of it in 
terms of a policy of a global public realm—forgetting that it is never Algeria that will 
intervene in France, or Finland in Chechnya”.45  
Keohane also advances a theory of good and bad neighbourhoods. Bad neighbour-
hoods have low social capital. Where social capital is low, trust is low, people dislike 
each other and there is little hope that the neighbourhood will improve. And since the 
success of an intervention is dependent upon the ability to unbundled sovereignty and 
build long-lasting institutions connecting neighbouring states, social capital within the 
neighbourhood must be high if re-construction is to succeed46 A good neighbourhood 
will educate the troubled state about, for example, “beliefs in the efficacy of the rule of 
law for attracting investment… and … liberal democratic norms”.47 An additional prob-
lem lies in the fact that good neighbourhoods cannot simply be created: “in the short 
                                                 
44  Keohane, Robert O., ‘Political Authority after Intervention: Gradations in Sovereignty’ in Holzgrefe, J. L., and 
Keohane, Robert O., (eds.) Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 296. 
45  Koskenniemi, Martti, ‘‘The Lady Doth Protest Too Much’ Kosovo, and the Turn to Ethics in International Law’ 
Modern Law Review (2002) vol. 65, no. 2, pp. 159-175, p. 172. 
46  Keohane, ‘Political Authority’, p. 293. 
47 Keohane, ‘Political Authority’, p. 294. 
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term, it would hardly be sage policy advice to suggest the creation of good neighbour-
hoods in order to make urgently needed humanitarian intervention successful”.48 
The solution, therefore, is to redefine the boundaries of a neighbourhood. If the Bal-
kans were a bad neighbourhood, the 1999 Kosovo intervention succeeded because Eu-
rope redefined its boundaries to include them. For this reason, any decision to intervene 
must consider not only the society, but the neighbourhood where it is located, and the 
possibilities for expanding good neighbourhoods close by.  
Keohane’s neighbourhood theory is not a straightjacket. Sometimes, he argues, hu-
man rights abuses are so severe that outside states are left with no choice. Yet the states 
which are left with no choice are powerful Western states and, more particularly, the 
United States. And so, we ask, is Washington ever really left with no choice when faced 
with mass atrocities abroad? There must have been a choice in Rwanda, since the Uni-
ted States did not act. And there must be a choice in Darfur. Again, the language of hu-
manitarianism—at root a popular conception of sovereignty—is deployed to justify li-
mitations on the sovereignty of other states, while the United States remains free to act 
as it chooses.  
5. NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS 
Traditional conceptions of sovereignty limit this attribute to states, but non-
governmental organizations have become an important feature of international affairs. 
NGOs often seek to challenge state sovereignty while operating in ways which bypass 
or undermine state power and control. They blur the boundaries between states and their 
citizens, and between states and the international system. By looking at the literature on 
NGOs, we can learn a great deal about US conceptions of sovereignty. 
Harold Koh and Louis Henkin both highlight how NGOs are altering the values of 
the international system, and how those values are transferred into national systems. 
Koh argues: “Many efforts at human rights norm-internalisation are begun not by na-
tion-states, but by ‘transnational norm entrepreneurs,’ private transnational organisa-
tions or individuals who mobilise popular opinion and political support within their host 
country and abroad for development of a universal human rights norm”.49 Such actors 
operate along vertical rather than horizontal lines, bringing international norms into 
domestic society though a process of “interaction, interpretation, and internalisation”.50 
However, it is unclear whether Koh believes that NGOs could have succeeded without 
                                                 
48  Keohane, ‘Political Authority’, p. 293. 
49  Koh, Harold Hongju, ‘How is International Human Rights Law Enforced?’ Indiana Law Journal (1999) vol. 74, 
pp. 1396-1417, p. 1409. Koh’s argument accords with Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink’s analysis of transna-
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50  Koh, ‘How is International Human Rights Law Enforced?’, p. 1413. 
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state acquiescence or support. Crucially the perception of such groups in the US litera-
ture is similar to that of lobbyists, at least in terms of their functions, if not their political 
goals. Such groups are considered to supplement the political process rather than tran-
scend it and consequently pose little threat to the sovereignty of the United States.  
Henkin attributes the rise of human rights to a combination of state and NGO efforts 
after the Second World War. The rights themselves arise out of tensions between state 
values and human values, “between attempts to keep commitments modest and pres-
sures to extend them”.51 For Henkin: “No discussion of enforcement of international 
norms is complete without stress on the importance of non-governmental contributions 
to the complex of inducements” that motivate state action.52 NGOs create these induce-
ments by disseminating information and mobilizing outrage, and thus persuading states 
to change laws, institutions and practices. But Henkin also sees NGOs as lobbyists ra-
ther than legislators, since states are free to decide whether to accept these inducements. 
Unable to force states to do anything, NGOs have relatively little impact upon sover-
eignty.  
Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink have developed the concept of “transnational 
advocacy networks”—“forms of organisation characterised by voluntary, reciprocal, 
and horizontal patterns of communication and exchange”.53 Their uniqueness lies in 
their advocacy, which revolves around “the centrality of values or principled ideas, the 
belief that individuals can make a difference, the creative use of information, and the 
employment… of sophisticated political strategies in targeting their campaigns”.54 The 
primary tactic employed by transnational advocacy networks is framing,55 whereby they 
use the “power of their information, ideas, and strategies to alter the information and 
value contexts within which states make policies”.56 For our purposes, the most signifi-
cant aspect of this analysis is the “boomerang pattern” whereby domestic NGOs bypass 
their state and search out international allies to bring pressure on their states from out-
side.57 Through this tactic, they might seem to be subverting the statist conception of 
                                                 
51  Henkin, Louis, International Law: Politics and Values (Boston: M. Nijhoff, 1995), p. 184. 
52  Henkin, International Law, p. 222. 
53  Keck, Margaret, and Sikkink, Kathryn Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics 
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998), p. 8. 
54  Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders, p. 2. 
55  S. A. Hunt, R. D. Benford & D. A. Snow, ‘Identity Fields: Framing Processes and the Social Construction of 
Movement Identities’ in E. Larana, H. Johnston & J.R. Gusfield (eds.), New Social Movements: From Ideology to 
Identity (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994) 185-208. 
56  Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders, p. 16. 
57  Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders, p. 12. 
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sovereignty. Transnational advocacy networks certainly believe that “it is both legiti-
mate and necessary for states or nonstate actors to be concerned about the treatment of 
the inhabitants of another state”.58  
However, any assessment of the role of NGOs depends upon the conception of sov-
ereignty underpinning it. If one expects states to have complete control over information 
and access to the courts, then NGOs represent a significant intrusion on sovereignty. 
But if one accepts that state control over civil society and public opinion has long been 
minimal—at least in the West—the achievements of NGOs are less dramatic. The key 
question is: does influence constitutes an expression of sovereignty? For again, the US 
literature on NGOs treats them as similar to lobbyists, which have never been accused 
of transgressing state sovereignty and occupy an accepted position in US politics. 
Not only are NGOs generally espousing a different set of values, they are developing 
and pursuing ever more aggressive tactics, including litigation. Dinah Shelton has writ-
ten on the use of amicus briefs by NGOs.59 She argues that international cases often ha-
ve a wider impact than domestic cases because they provide more persuasive prece-
dents. And most international courts (with the notable exception of the International 
Court of Justice) enable third parties to make written submissions—providing a valu-
able point of access for NGOs in a system which is almost entirely limited to states. 
There are other advantages too: amicus briefs are relatively inexpensive, their authors 
are not bound by the decision and can re-litigate the same issue elsewhere, and they are 
not restricted to addressing the narrow legal issues of any particular case. But again, 
NGOs are not taking on the same role as states; instead, they are seeking to influence a 
system that remains dominated by states. And for this reason they are not undermining 
state sovereignty. 
Julie Mertus explores the questionable democratic status of NGOs, their growing in-
fluence, and the possibility that they might be co-opted by states. Transnational civil 
society has power imbalances which are not widely recognised. For example, most 
NGOs operate from the top-down and, while they can potentially raise the concerns of 
unheard voices, some “act in a manner that silences marginalised voices and undermi-
nes democratic principles of transparency, accountability and participation”.60 Indeed, 
many NGOs operate in ways that threaten local autonomy, either by believing that they 
know best, or simply striving to operate within the existing practices of inter-
                                                 
58  Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders, p. 36. 
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governmental organizations such as the United Nations. As Mertus observes, since 
“powerful NGOs designed the ‘backdoor process’…they therefore have little incentive 
to change it”.61 The situation is exacerbated by the growing tendency for NGOs to as-
sume functions which were once the prerogative of states, for “[o]nce they become a 
sort of ‘public service sub-contractor’, NGOs are in continual danger of having their 
local accountabilities and ethical principles compromised by the financial and discursive 
capacity of states to shape their agendas”.62 NGOs therefore: “no longer fulfil their role 
as nonstate counterparts in trasnational civil society”.63 Mertus’ analysis confirms that, 
when US scholars write about NGOs, they do not perceive them as a threat to sove-
reignty, or at least not to that of the United States. 
6. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND US DOMESTIC LAW 
The peculiarity of US conceptions of sovereignty is brought into sharp relief in acade-
mic discussions of the relationship between international law and US domestic law—a 
relationship that has generated a substantial literature within the United States, not least 
because of the Alien Tort Claims Act of 1789.  
Alien Tort Claims Act 
International law considers some crimes so heinous that perpetrators can be brought to 
justice wherever they are found. This principle of universal jurisdiction entitles states to 
either prosecute those accused or extradite them to another state that will. The Alien 
Tort Claims Act (“ATCA”), a US piece of legislation, extended the principle of univer-
sal jurisdiction to civil litigation, granting jurisdiction over “any civil action by an alien 
for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United 
States”.64 The ATCA was enacted as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, but was largely 
ignored until 1980 and the Filartiga case, when it was interpreted as providing a cause 
of action in federal courts in cases involving torture committed by officials of foreign 
governments. In Filartiga, the Federal Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, had to resolve 
several issues, not least the fact that the ATCA was almost 200 years old. It ruled: 
“courts must interpret international law not as it was in 1789, but as it has evolved and 
exists among the nations of the world today”.65 In subsequent cases, other federal courts 
have accepted this holding, and it is widely supported by legal scholars. Similarly the 
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court rejected that view that violations committed by states against their citizens are not 
violations of international law, as “clearly out of tune with the current usage and prac-
tice of international law”.66 
The Filartiga approach has been attacked by a number of academics, as well as by 
the administration of George W. Bush. They argue that the ATCA, instead of applying 
to all torts committed in violation of international law, should only apply to those acts 
which violate rights under US law. However, in July 2004, in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 
the US Supreme Court rejected this attempted reinterpretation. 
Despite fears that Filartiga would unleash a flood of litigation, “only a handful of ca-
ses have sustained jurisdiction under the ATCA in the years since the Filartiga deci-
sion”.67 Beth Stephens, a supporter of the Filartiga approach, writes: “One must hope 
that as they become more familiar with the concepts of international law, US courts will 
begin to accept international law arguments in a wider range of cases”.68  
Harold Koh—another supporter, and the Dean of Yale Law School—offers a theory 
of transnational public law litigation that focuses on the attempts of both state and non-
state entities to adjudicate human rights cases, and the arising overlaps between domes-
tic and international law.69 Although “United States courts routinely applied interna-
tional law in domestic cases” during the mid- to late-nineteenth century,70 more recently 
two factors have impeded the importation of international law. First, the doctrine of 
non-self-executing treaties (that is, treaties which must be implemented by statute to 
acquire domestic legal effect) has been invoked. However, Koh argues that the Suprem-
acy Clause in the US Constitution, which makes treaties the supreme law of the land, 
does not distinguishes between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties.  
The second factor identified by Koh is the Act of State doctrine, solidified in Banco 
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, where the US Supreme Court indicated that national 
courts lack judicial competence to inquire into the legality of acts by foreign states. The 
Sabbatino ruling cast “a profound chill upon the willingness of United States domestic 
courts to interpret or articulate norms of international law”.71 However, two important 
trends arose in the late 1970s: a growing public acceptance that federal courts should 
restructure wrongful systems; and an unprecedented growth in transnational commercial 
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litigation, with federal courts increasingly deciding cases brought by individuals and 
private entities against foreign governments. This led to the question: “if contracts, why 
not torture?”72 The two trends came together in the Filartiga case. 
Promoters of the ATCA clearly support a popular conception of sovereignty. Con-
sider, for instance, the impact on Paraguayan sovereignty of the Filartiga case, where 
the defendant had been a police chief at the time of the torture. Yet the ATCA does not 
apply to the US government or its officials as defendants (because of “sovereignty im-
munity” and the “political questions doctrine”), nor to acts committed within the United 
States. So supporters of the ATCA are in no way challenging the sovereignty of the U-
nited States. For this reason, one might ask why the Bush administration and some aca-
demics regard the Filartiga line of cases as a threat. As the following section suggests, 
it is not just sovereignty they perceive to be threatened, but the balance of power be-
tween the federal government and the constituent states of the United States. 
International Law as US Law 
Curtis Bradley and Jack Goldsmith argue against what they refer to as the “modern po-
sition”, which Bradley defines as “the proposition that customary international law has 
the status of federal common law”73—and therefore pre-empts inconsistent state law.  
Bradley claims that one of the modern position’s central arguments, that customary 
international law had the status of federal law in the 19th century, is false. Instead, the 
relevant precedent is Erie Railroad v Tompkins (1938), which the modern position con-
tradicts. According to Bradley, Erie was significant because it rejected two principles 
which had previously underpinned the jurisprudence: that federal courts can apply law 
not derived from a sovereign source, and that courts merely discover the common law 
rather than make it. Thus, to Bradley, Erie ended the debate as to whether customary 
international law is federal law, and whether federal courts can apply customary interna-
tional law which has not been incorporated by the political branches. 
Bradley and Goldsmith are particularly concerned about what they identify as “new” 
customary international law, which arose mainly in the twentieth century, predomi-
nantly concerns human rights, and is “less consensual and less objective than traditional 
customary international law, and … more likely to conflict with domestic law”.74 More 
to the point, they fear that this new law will “regulate many areas that were formerly of 
exclusive domestic concern”.75  
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From a similar political standpoint, John Yoo and Eric Posner argue that the US 
Constitution recognises no judicial body as superior to the Supreme Court, and that this 
renders international courts irrelevant. Yoo and Posner even write that the International 
Court of Justice “insults American sovereignty by attempting to bypass the executive 
branch, which is constitutionally charged with conducting foreign policy for the na-
tion”.76 They are particularly incensed that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia could 
bring a case against the United States during the 1999 Kosovo intervention, despite the 
fact that the case was dismissed on jurisdictional grounds. Curiously, this disdain for 
international law does not extend however to the Security Council—presumably be-
cause of the US veto—since Yoo relies on Council resolutions to justifying the 2003 
Iraq War.77 In any event, it is clear that Goldsmith, Bradley, Yoo and Posner ascribe to a 
statist conception of sovereignty, or at least US sovereignty. But what of those who op-
pose their views? 
Koh disagrees that allowing treaties to have direct effect in US law is an affront to 
US sovereignty: 
[I]f one uses “sovereignty” in the modern sense of that term—a nation’s capac-
ity to participate in international affairs—I would argue that the selective inter-
nalisation of international law into US law need not affront US sovereignty. To 
the contrary … the process of visibly obeying international norms builds US 
“soft power,” enhances its moral authority, and strengthens US capacity for 
global leadership in a post-September 11 world.78   
Koh argues that the desire to remain unfettered by international law is “ultimately… 
more America’s loss than that of the world”79 because it means that the United States 
rarely gets credit for the good it does, including by providing leadership on democracy 
and human rights. Moreover, “by opposing the global rules, the United States can end 
up undermining the legitimacy of the rules themselves… [and] disempower itself from 
invoking those rules, at precisely the moment when it needs those rules to serve its own 
national purposes”.80 Although he has a positive view of international law, note that Koh 
focuses on the law’s ability to re-enforce US power and thus, presumably, its sover-
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eignty—or at least its ability to not worry about the negative consequences of dimin-
ished or shared sovereignty. 
Koh believes the correct reading of Erie and Sabbatino is that federal courts retain 
legitimate authority to treat established rules of customary international law as federal 
common law: “Far from being novel, the ‘modern position’ is actually a long-accepted, 
traditional reading of the federal courts’ function. Both before and after Erie, the federal 
courts issued rulings construing the law of nations. Erie never intended to alter or dis-
rupt that practice”.81 “At bottom,” Koh argues, “Bradley and Goldsmith’s complaint 
reduces to this: ‘unelected federal judges apply customary international law made by the 
world community at the expense of state prerogatives’.”82 And to this he responds: “So 
what else is new?”83 Moreover, “Bradley and Goldsmith nowhere explain why explicit 
federal legislation—a process notoriously dominated by committees, strong-willed indi-
viduals, collective action problems, and private rent-seeking—is invariably more de-
mocratic than the judge-driven process they criticize”.84 
On the issue of a “new” and subversive customary international law, Koh replies that 
there is “no clear line [which] separates the ‘old’ from the ‘new’ customary interna-
tional law because both have influenced American law through precisely the same 
transnational legal process”.85 Moreover, since the United States has long been the most 
influential country in the making of customary international law, including in the human 
rights field, it is hardly being forced into positions it opposes.  
But Koh, Bradley and Goldsmith, despite their differences, share a statist conception 
of US sovereignty. They simply differ in their assessments of where US interests lie. As 
Koh observes, Bradley and Goldsmith have simply stumbled into the “power struggle 
image” of state-federal conflict, which portrays states and national governments as 
competing sovereigns.86  
7. THE ANTI-INTERNATIONALISTS 
Bradley and Goldsmith are prominent contributors to a growing body of literature that 
seeks to protect US sovereignty from the constraints of international law. There are sev-
eral strands to this literature. As we have already seen, there is a body of writing con-
cerning the status of international law within the US legal system. Second, there a body 
of literature that applies game theory, or rational choice approaches, to distinguish be-
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tween traditional international law (law of the sea, diplomatic immunity) and modern 
international law (human rights, international criminal law) and argue that only the for-
mer counts as real international law which binds the United States. Finally, there is a 
body of literature that denies international law is law, especially those rules which pur-
port to constrain US military force. Collectively, we label these scholars the “anti-
internationalists”.87 They are unapologetically committed to the statist sovereignty of the 
United States. 
Rational Choice 
Rational choice theory has gained a following across numerous academic disciplines, 
especially in the United States, including among the anti-internationalists. Following 
basic rational choice precepts, Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner argue that “international 
law emerges from states acting rationally to maximise their interests, given their percep-
tions of the interests of other states and the distribution of state power”.88 At the same 
time, they exclude a preference for obeying international law from their composite of 
state preferences from which they infer interests. This they do for two reasons. First, it 
is “unenlightening”89 to explain compliance in terms of a preference for obeying interna-
tional law. Second, a preference for compliance is dependent upon what citizens and 
leaders are “willing to pay in terms of other things that they care about”, such as secu-
rity or economic growth. Goldsmith and Posner assert that people “care about these lat-
ter goods more intensely than they do about international law compliance”.90 Thus any 
theory of international law must show why states comply, rather than just assuming that 
they have a preference for so doing.  
In common with other anti-internationalists, Goldsmith and Posner argue that an o-
verly optimistic idea of the power and potential of international law can be a dangerous 
thing, encouraging states to sacrifice elements of their sovereignty, adopt multilateral-
ism and compromise their ability to act independently. In echoing realist international 
relations theory, Goldsmith and Posner place survival at the apex of state preferences, 
closely followed by the strengthening of US business and the protection of US jobs. 
They manifest no concern for the welfare of people overseas.91 For Goldsmith and Pos-
ner, the world is fairly simple: states comply for instrumental reasons; the task at hand 
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is the elucidation of those interests, and here rational choice can assist. Their conception 
of sovereignty is, again, entirely statist. 
Andrew Guzman also uses a rational choice approach, though for him the self-
interest of states is manifested primarily as reputation. A good record of obeying inter-
national law and abiding by international agreements has, as its pay-off, an increased 
willingness on the part of other states to cooperate. As a result, “We can no longer be 
satisfied with the simple conclusion that the ordering principle of the international legal 
order is pacta sunt servanda, the principle that ‘treaties are to be obeyed’.”92 And yet, 
Guzman’s approach, while more nuanced and less anti-internationalist that Goldsmith 
and Posner’s, shares its adherence to a statist conception of sovereignty. 
Is International Law really Law? 
A final strand of the anti-internationalist literature denies that international law is really 
law. This school of thought focuses primarily on the law regulating the use of force, and 
is motivated by a desire that nothing whatsoever should stand in the way of US sover-
eignty, including its sovereign right to assert itself abroad. 
Michael Glennon argues that, since the 1999 Kosovo intervention, the rules concern-
ing the use of force are “no longer regarded as obligatory by states” and “the [UN] 
Charter’s use-of-force regime has all but collapsed”.93 The international system has be-
come split into a de jure system where “illusory rules” govern the use of force and a de 
facto system where states follow self-interest and the legal rules are all but ignored. 
Maintaining the fiction that states are constrained by international rules is, according to 
Glennon, more dangerous than having no rules at all because it engenders a false sense 
of security.   
Glennon argues that the United States and NATO have decided to follow a “vague 
new system that is much more tolerant of military intervention but has few hard and fast 
rules”.94 But we should not mourn the death of the old system, for it was incapable of 
recognising a simple truth: that the core threat to international security comes, not from 
interstate violence, but from state sponsored terrorism.95 In this context, “[t]he risks po-
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sed by a universal system that provides no escape from lawfully centralised coercion 
remain greater than the risks of a system that lacks coercive enforcement mecha-
nisms”.96 Glennon does offer an alternative: an acceptance that states are not equal in 
power, wealth or their commitment to human rights, and that some are less sovereign 
than others. Securing justice requires power, not law, though if “power is used to do 
justice, law will follow.”97 
In a Wall Street Journal op-ed in 1997, John Bolton, who was then a Fellow of the 
American Enterprise Institute and is now US Ambassador to the United Nations, wrote: 
“Treaties are law only for US domestic purposes” and that, “[i]n their international op-
eration, treaties are simply political obligations”.98 In other words, unless a treaty has 
been implemented by legislation, it is simply a political consideration and may be ig-
nored. The same approach is evident in Bolton’s take on the International Criminal 
Court, which he rejects on the basis of sovereignty and the separation of powers doc-
trine. Similarly, Bolton believes that what is at stake in the debate over the United Na-
tions is “the basic principle underlying constitutional representative government: legiti-
mate sovereignty ultimately rests with the citizens”.99 Thus Bolton’s approach, like that 
of the other anti-internationalists, has popular elements that—with regard to the United 
States at least—work to reinforce a strongly statist conception of sovereignty. 
Although it is easy to score points off Bolton, his central argument needs to be ad-
dressed. Is the international system simply about power? Does might make right? Why 
is not in the interest of the United States to acquire what it wants, however it can, re-
gardless of international law? At present critics respond to the argument in moral terms, 
but this is a weak defence because Bolton’s argument is implicitly moral. Those who 
argue that it is in the self-interest of the United States to garner world support depend 
upon the assumption that the United States needs that support. This, Bolton et al. deny. 
Jeremy Rabkin likewise believes that international politics cannot be constrained by 
international law and that it is dangerous to allow restrictions on what could be entirely 
legitimate actions, such as anticipatory self-defence. Any supposition that there could be 
an underlying consensus which renders force unnecessary is greatly mistaken100 and the 
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US “will not entrust its security to “authorities” that have no means of protecting the 
United States”.101 Since international authority cannot compel the deployment of forces 
it cannot protect nations when needed; international organisations simply cannot per-
form the functions of states. Yet Rabkin insists that unfettered US sovereignty should 
not be feared; indeed he doubts that the world is scared of America. Most importantly, 
Rabkin considers sovereignty to be a good thing: it can promote peace among states but 
it can also enable people within a particular state to focus on how to improve their state 
without the distraction of intervention.  
We thus see several elements in the anti-internationalist conception of sovereignty. 
First, there is an overriding concern that international law not impede US actions. Any 
attempts to impose international rules upon the United States are mistaken and ill-
conceived. Second, rational choice theory is used to prove the conditionality of states’ 
compliance which international law: such compliance is neither automatic nor guaran-
teed. States will defect if it is in their interest to do so. Both these elements lead to the 
questioning of whether international law is really law. According to this school of 
thought, international law is little more than wishful thinking and incapable of meeting 
the demands of international politics. All the anti-internationalists share the same under-
lying cynicism about the ability of law to constrain power. In the end, their conception 
of US sovereignty involves little more than that—unadulterated, overwhelming power.  
8. SOME TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS 
John Jackson explains that debates about sovereignty are really debates about alloca-
tions of power and that a discourse of sovereignty is adopted to conceal what is really a 
discourse about power. Thus “most of the sovereignty objections of joining an interna-
tional treaty are arguments about the allocation of power among different levels of dif-
ferent human institutions, mostly governmental.”102 The sovereignty discourse is used 
because it has an emotional appeal and is often used in a “blunt and undifferentiated 
way as a surrogate argument by opponents of some government proposal.”103 
The link between sovereignty and discourses of power might usefully be illuminated 
by a consideration of the early days of the American Republic, when considerable value 
was ascribed to international law. This was mainly because of the United States’ relative 
weakness compared to other nations—America was glad of the protections afforded by 
international rules. The United States also promoted several developments in interna-
tional law—such as the right to self-defence as an exception to the unlimited legality of 
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war, and the law of maritime neutrality—to protect it against being drawn into conflict 
with European powers. During the same period, Congress adopted the Alien Tort 
Claims Act and the US Supreme Court produced a series of pro-international law jud-
gements. 
After the Second World War, the United States sought to develop international law 
and international institutions in furtherance of its new-found status as the world’s most 
powerful country. It led the development of the United Nations, World Bank and Inter-
national Monetary Fund, as well as instruments such as the Geneva Conventions, Geno-
cide Convention, Universal Declaration of Human Rights and General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade. Indeed, for much of its history the United States has supported multi-
lateral rules and institutions, recognising that involvement equals influence, and that 
rules and institutions can facilitate as well as constrain. 
Yet there are distinctive elements of the American psyche, identified early on by A-
lexis de Tocqueville, which would seem to influence how Americans conceptualize so-
vereignty today. Most important of these is the celebration of popular sovereignty 
within the United States. As Tocqueville saw it, Americans essentially did rule them-
selves, so weak and restricted was government, and so aware of its popular origins: 
“The people reign over the American political world as God rules over the universe. It is 
the cause and the end of all things; everything rises out of it and is absorbed back into 
it”.104 As a consequence, the US Constitution is considered—not just by John Bolton—
to be superior to international law.  
A corollary element is the high level of political activism amongst ordinary Ameri-
cans, which Tocqueville called “a restless activity, superabundant force, an energy ne-
ver found elsewhere”.105 In Tocqueville’s account, if an obstacle blocks a road, the local 
people will form a committee and solve the problem themselves, without ever thinking 
of contacting local government.106 A historic suspicion of government, particularly the 
federal government, helps explain the anti-internationalists’ opposition to international 
law as federal law, and to supranational institutions especially.  
Tocqueville also observed that the state and federal systems constituted “two distinct 
social structures… In a word, there are twenty four [now 50] little sovereign nations 
who together form the United States”.107 Suspicion of federal government was rein-
forced by the parochialism of American life where an individual’s primary allegiance 
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was to her township, then to county, then to state, and only in the last instance to the 
United States. All the more reason for today’s anti-internationalists to reject treaties and 
customary international law that could override the sovereign rights of the individual 
constituent states! 
An additional explanation for the suspicion of government was provided by Freder-
ick Jackson Turner, who argued that the frontier fundamentally shaped American iden-
tity.108 For Turner, the frontier was a region of complete freedom where people were 
forced to be self-reliant and innovative, creating their own social and political institu-
tions outside of the reach of law or government. The “frontier thesis” helps to explain 
the American suspicion of authority, especially authority imposed from the outside, as 
today’s anti-internationalists perceive international institutions and international law to 
be. Of additional interest is the fact that Turner presented his thesis just as the American 
frontier was ceasing to exist. In this new context, the need to grow and conquer that was 
central to thesis meant that the United States had to expand overseas. And this new 
frontier, by definition, had to be devoid of law or government also. 
Americans are also highly patriotic. As Tocqueville observed: “The American, tak-
ing part in everything that is done in his country, feels a duty to defend anything criti-
cised there, for it is not only his country that is being attacked, but himself.”109 This “ir-
ritable patriotism”110 produces a national pride which Tocqueville saw as “not only 
greedy but also restless and jealous… both mendicant and querulous.”111 Tocqueville 
analyzed the constant need to reaffirm the rectitude of the American way of life as a 
sign of insecurity, though it is possible that the continual assertion of the superiority of 
the American way of life has since moved beyond insecurity into unthinking arrogance. 
The end of the Cold War created an unprecedented opportunity for countries to tran-
scend statist conceptions of sovereignty. The UN Security Council’s authorizing of the 
1991 Gulf War gave legitimate hope that a “new world order” (to quote President 
George H.W. Bush) was possible, based on multilateral decision-making and the rule of 
law. What has emerged instead is American unipolarity and a slide towards disorder, 
partly—though not exclusively—as a result of the second Bush administration’s re-
sponse to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. The administration used the fear 
and patriotism generated by the attacks to pursue political and legal changes that certain 
of its members had long desired, as evidenced by the Project for the New American 
Century. It helped too that the morality which has always been implicit in American 
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political discourse increased in strength and stridency during this period—partly as a 
result of the language and actions of President George W. Bush himself. 
Although a belief in self-government, popular sovereignty and its own moral superi-
ority might push the United States to expand, a suspicion of big government and a pref-
erence for the parochial would seem to push it toward isolation. These two countervail-
ing tendencies have shaped US foreign policy for centuries. They necessarily shape con-
temporary US conceptions of sovereignty. 
We suspect that the dichotomous nature of US conceptions of sovereignty can be ex-
plained—at least partly—by these elements of the American psyche. On the one hand, 
self-belief, a “can-do” attitude and a conviction that others deserve popular sovereignty 
also, combine to generate a belief that the United States can and should intervene, and 
that interventions are invariably beneficial to recipient countries. In America’s percep-
tion of itself, the US national interest hardly ever appears. On the other hand, the isola-
tionist tendency and the belief in self-government combine to generate a belief that 
American sovereignty may never be compromised. Thus, ideology, activism and arro-
gance permit and justify intervention in other states while the absolute privileging of US 
self-government—as opposed to the relative privileging of self-government else-
where—prevents interference by outside actors in US affairs and makes Americans in-
stinctively suspicious of international institutions and international law. 
The bifurcated nature of the American psyche would thus seem to have contributed 
to a bifurcated conception of sovereignty, a conception that we have traced through the 
recent writings of a number of US scholars of international relations and international 
law. Regardless of whether they evince a statist or popular conception of sovereignty, 
and regardless of whether they support or oppose international law and international 
institutions, they almost never suggest that the sovereignty of the United States should 
be compromised. The sovereignty to be delegated, “unbundled” or otherwise under-
mined is nearly always that of other states. 
It bears repeating that this bifurcated conception would likely be impossible without 
American self-belief. But what is self-belief if not self-interest? How do the two relate 
to each other? The moralistic overtones of US foreign policy have influenced—and in 
turn been influenced by—an assumption that the United States acts altruistically. It in-
tervenes for the good of others, for it is simply not a part of the American identity that 
the United States could be exploitative or imperial. For non-Americans, at least, it is 
difficult to reconcile this apparent selflessness with what, on close examination, seems 
to be an entirely self-serving approach to sovereignty—until we understand that the two 
conceptions are but different sides of a single coin. 
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